Information Security Seminar 

26/02/2010, 16:15 — 17:15 — Room P3.10, Mathematics Building
Cas Cremers, ETH Zurich

Modeling and Analyzing Security in the Presence of Compromising Adversaries

We present a framework for modeling adversaries in security protocol analysis, in which we define a hierarchy of adversary models. These models range from a Dolev-Yao style adversary to more powerful adversaries who can reveal different parts of principals' states during protocol execution. Our adversary models unify and generalize many existing security notions from both the computational and symbolic settings and lead to new, previously unexplored security notions. We extend an existing symbolic protocol-verification tool with our adversary models. This is the first tool that systematically supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of state-reveal queries. In extensive case studies, we automatically find new attacks and rediscover known attacks that previously required detailed manual analysis. Joint work with David Basin.