Logical Proofs of Authentication Protocols and Type-Flaw Attacks (joint work with Gergei Bana)
Extended Abstract presented at the 6th Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptography (FCC). Affiliated Workshop of CSF'10, Edinburgh, UK, July 20 2010.

Abstract: In this work we apply the logical system introduced by Bana et al. [BHO10] to the proof of authentication protocols, namely Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, the amended Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol, and the Otway-Rees protocol. We have proven agreement and authentication properties of these protocols, up to their known weaknesses, for an unbounded number of sessions. The computational soundness of the logical system ensures us the soundness of the security results.

Publication Info. Extended Abstract.

Date: 12 May 2010.

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